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Abstract 
The aim of the research is to study the capacity for self-evaluation of University students 
undergoing tests involving mathematics, linguistic and formal reasoning. Subjects were 
asked to estimate the number of correct answers and subsequently to compare their 
performance with that of their peers. We divided the subjects into three groups on the basis 
of performance: poor, middle and top performers. The results demonstrate that all the 
subjects in all tests showed good awareness of their level of actual performance. Analyzing 
comparative assessments, the results reported in literature by Kruger and Dunning were 
confirmed: poor performers tend to significantly overestimate their own performance whilst 
top performers tend to underestimate it. This can be interpreted as a demonstration that 
the accuracy of comparative self-evaluations depends on a number of variables: cognitive 
and metacognitive factors and aspects associated with self-representation. Our conclusion 
is that cognitive and metacognitive processes work as “submerged” in highly subjective 
representations, allowing dynamics related to safeguarding the image one has of oneself to 
play a role. 
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Introduction 
Metacognition 
Metacognition is the totality of psychic activities overseeing the cognitive 
function (Cornoldi 1995). These activities comprise the knowledge an 
individual has in relation to mental functions and mechanisms of control 
and self-regulation activated whilst carrying out first level cognitive 
activities. 
Metacognitive knowledge refers to what a subject knows or believes 
about a number of cognitive processes, such as memory, understanding, 
studies, etc. It may include ideas about cognitive functioning in general, 
convictions about one’s own skills, the awareness of the existence of 
cognitive problems and one’s ability to solve them, knowledge about the 
efficacy and use of strategies and personal strengths and weaknesses in this 
regard. All these elements may derive from personal experience or from the 
observation of the behaviour of others (De Beni & Moè, 2000). 
Control and self-regulating mechanisms, on the other hand, play a 
guiding and supervisory role over cognitive processes. They include, for 
example, planning of the task, anticipating the performance, choosing a 
suitable strategy and verifying the choices made on the basis of the 
evaluation of results. 
The distinction between knowledge and metacognitive control derives 
from studies carried out in three parallel areas of research and which are 
the origins of the two leading aspects attributed to metacognition: studies 
into cognitive development following the developmental theory of Piaget 
(1974, 1975), the work of Vygotskij (1978) on the social origin of cognitive 
control and studies based on the Human Information Processing (HIP) 
model (Richard, 1990). Whilst references to developmental psychology and, 
in particular, to Piaget’s theories, have stressed the awareness of the subject 
in relation to the functioning of his/her mental states, studies based on 
cognitive psychology and the HIP model have pointed to the role of control 
the subject can exercise over his/her cognitive activities. References to 
Vygotskij have underlined the central role of regulation mechanisms, the 
importance of cultural transmission and the educational role of the adult in 
relation to both metacognitive knowledge and the use of the various 
strategies.  
From the historical point of view, the origin of the metacognitive theory 
resides in the studies of Flavell at the beginning of the seventies. The term 
‘metacognition’ was used for the first time, in fact, by Flavell in his 
pioneering work of 1976, mainly in relation to studies on memory.  
In his model Flavell (1981) included regulation aspects in his definition 
of metacognition, meaning by it “the totality of knowledge or cognitive 
activities which have as object or regulate all the aspects of mental acts” 
(Flavell, 1981, p. 37): alongside knowledge metacognitive experiences are 
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introduced, understood as ideas, thoughts, sensations, relating to cognitive 
activities acting at all levels of the task, before, during and after.  
Beginning with these initial models, there was then a proliferation of 
studies which gradually attributed greater and greater importance to 
control and monitoring aspects, alongside the aspects linked to knowledge of 
cognitive processes, going so far as to affirm that metacognition influenced 
cognitive activities, among other ways, through monitoring, regulation and 
orchestration (Brown, A. L., & DeLoache, 1978; Campione & Brown, 1978).  
The model put forward by Brown (1987) focused specifically on the 
monitoring activity that accompanies carrying out the task and suggested 
that there are various types of metacognitive control processes: anticipation 
of the performance level, planning, monitoring and evaluation. 
In 1985 Borkowski put forward a model in which various metacognitive 
skills of control and regulation can be identified, including: awareness of 
one’s own cognitive function and of this function in general, expectation, 
planning, monitoring, metacognitive review, evaluation, abstraction and 
transfer.  
Similarly, Pintrich, Wolters and Baxter (as cited in Borkowski, 1996, 
p.393) distinguished between three correlated aspects of metacognition: 
Knowledge, Judgement-Monitoring and Self Regulation.  
Consequently, the most recent metacognitive models have been 
enriched by contributions from emotive-motivational theory (Borkowski & 
Muthukrishna, 1995; De Beni & Pazzaglia, 1991; Hultsch, Herzog, Dixon & 
Davidson, 1988; Moè & De Beni, 1995), describing metacognition as a 
complex interactive system with diverse components: variables associated 
with personal and motivational states (attributive style, motivation to use a 
strategic form of behaviour), self-esteem and self-efficacy (sense of personal 
value, knowledge of possible selves, awareness of one’s aims), in addition to 
knowledge of strategies and control processes.  
Self-image and causal attributions 
Within these variables it seems that an important place is occupied 
precisely by those personal factors which may act as a driver to activate, 
maintain and, if necessary, correct one’s cognitive activity: the concepts of 
self-efficacy and the expectation of a result (Bandura, 1986, 2000; Mazzoni, 
2000). The first referred to the degree of confidence of an individual in 
relation to the likelihood of achieving an objective he has set himself. The 
second referred to the relationship between the way a task is carried out 
and the result the individual expects to achieve, given the way the task is to 
be carried out. Evaluations of self-efficacy varied on the basis of three 
dimensions: difficulty of the task, degree of generality/specificity of the 
evaluation and the strength of the evaluation. The generality/specificity 
dimension referred to the awareness an individual has of possessing some or 
many skills, whilst the intensity of the sense of self-efficacy referred to the 
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degree of conviction an individual has in relation to his skills. There was a 
positive correlation between a high degree of conviction and good 
performance. This is because those with a high sense of self-efficacy persist 
in tasks where they initially fail (Bandura, 1986).  
Moè and De Beni (1995) distinguished between an objective of 
mastering a task (or learning aims) and the aim to achieve personal success. 
According to the authors, those who had the aim to achieve mastery wish to 
improve their culture, believed in co-operating with others and wanted to 
learn new strategies, applied themselves and thought that understanding is 
more important than memorizing. On the contrary, those who seeked 
personal success were motivated by the need to feel superior to others, they 
believed this was necessary in order to be successful without making much 
effort (Ames & Archer, 1988). Clearly this model was close to that of Dweck 
(1999) who distinguished between motivation based on mastery and 
motivation based on performance. 
Petter (1992) distinguished between direct motivations, based on the 
quality of the activity or prestige, and indirect motivations associated with 
“projects” or “problems” and extrinsic motivations, represented by marks, 
rewards and punishments.  
Closely linked to motivation is the subject’s style of attribution. The 
process of attribution takes place when an individual, observing an event, 
attributes to that event a specific cause (Frieze & Bar Tal, 1980). The 
importance of attributions is given by the fact that they influence cognitive 
performances and learning at school, persistence, the choice of a task, 
emotions and expectancies, contributing to produce success and failure. 
Heider (1958) was one of the first researchers to propose a 
classification based on the attribution of inner or outer causes, 
distinguishing between events attributed to oneself and events attributed to 
external causes. 
Other authors, including Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and 
Rosenbaum (1978), introduced the analysis of stability in relation to the 
cause, distinguishing between stable causes such as skills and unstable 
causes such as luck. The dimension of stability influences changes in the 
expectations of the individual after a success or failure.  
Weiner (1986) further enriched these classifications by introducing the 
idea of the controllability of these causes or lack of it. He pointed out that 
emotions linked to self-esteem (for example satisfaction, confidence, guilt, 
etc.) are closely correlated with the attribution locus. The attribution of a 
success to oneself (inner attribution locus, e.g. skill), generates good self-
esteem, whereas the attribution to oneself of a failure causes a lack of self-
esteem. If the cause of success/failure is attributed to the task, the result 
may be a sense of satisfaction (for a success) or sense of guilt (for a failure). 
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In the situations in which the attribution is for an external attributive 
locus (e.g. the help of others), the feelings are of gratitude in the event of 
success and anger in cases of failure.  
In the light of all these theories and models it seems clear that, in 
relation to metacognition, alongside cognitive factors, motivation and 
processes linked to emotions/affections play an important role. 
In this regard, the formulation of Nisbett and Ross (1980) was 
particularly lucid: the biases of human inference may be attributed to 
logical errors the subject commits while processing information, or to the 
interference of motivational or emotional factors which disturb and deform 
the resulting representations. In the authors’ definition, explanations of the 
first type are “cold” cognitions, those of the second type are “hot” cognitions. 
Although specifying that there are no scientifically validated reasons for 
opting for one interpretation or the other, Nisbett and Ross declared their 
preference for “cold” explanations; and, in fact, it is known that their paper 
was one of the crucial moments in heuristic research and in cognitive 
processes “with limited rationality”. 
Finally, as Rivière (1999) pointed out, these two approaches (hot vs. 
cold) can also be found in studies on the development of meta-representative 
thought where they are focussed on computational models based on the 
processing of information and on models based on the construction of 
representations of a socio-cognitive nature 
Self-evaluation of cognitive performance 
An interesting sector within the metacognitive approach, where 
metacognitive knowledge, control processes and emotional-motivational 
aspects are intertwined, is the area of metacognitive assessments. Self-
evaluation of performance and cognitive skills is considered a fundamental 
dimension of the control functions carried out by metacognitive monitoring 
and depends, as we have already seen, on a number of cognitive, 
metacognitive and emotional-motivational variables (Cadamuro, 2004; 
Cornoldi, 1995; Flavell, 1981; Izaute & Chambres, 2002; Mazzoni & Nelson, 
1998; Schwartz & Perfect, 2002). 
Metacognitive assessments are subjective judgements relating to the 
personal ability to succeed in a given task (De Beni & Moè, 2000). When 
preparing to carry out the task and in assessing the results, there is a 
spontaneous anticipation of the likely performance and reflection about the 
results. This becomes the basis for modifying forecasts of results in 
subsequent tests. 
The awareness of one’s own cognitive performance limits was studied 
in depth by Kruger and Dunning (1999). The authors asked various subject 
samples to carry out tests involving logical reasoning, to assess examples of 
humour, to undergo tests involving syntactical skills and then to evaluate 
their performance and skills in each area. Subjects were asked to provide 
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these assessments referring to the “average performance and skills of 
students at their University”, using a percentage scale of 0 to 100, whose 
meaning was self-evident but was also explained. The results showed one 
phenomenon very clearly and, to some extent, paradoxically: the subjects 
who obtained the lowest actual performance scores overestimated both their 
performances and their skills in relation to performance. On the other hand, 
the subjects with the highest scores tended to underestimate their 
performance and skills. The explanation of the phenomenon seems to 
involve a lack of metacognitive skill, accompanied by low skills as shown by 
the tests. In other words those who do not know how to do things also don’t 
know that they don’t know how to do them; they also fail to properly assess 
others’ skills as some of the variations of the experiment of Kruger and 
Dunning show. For example, some of the subjects who had been tested for 
syntactical skills were later asked to look at the tests of 5 others with 
similar scores. The least able in terms of the test were also the least able in 
assessing others’ tests and the most able in terms of the tests were also the 
best able to assess others’ tests. 
The underestimation by the most able subjects may be due to the 
difficulty in assessing the average performance of others, an effect called 
“false consensus” consisting in over-optimistic assessments of the abilities of 
others. In order to verify this hypothesis, Kruger and Dunning asked low 
scorers to undergo first a test of logical reasoning, then training in logic to 
provide them with the cognitive and metacognitive skills required to correct 
their overestimations. This training significantly reduced errors in self-
evaluation in the lowest scorers, confirming, in the authors’ opinion, the 
hypothesis that poor basic skills are accompanied by low metacognitive 
awareness. For the high scorers, it was enough to give them some low-
scoring tests to correct their optimistic assessments of the average skills of 
others.  
In 2002 Krueger and Mueller joined the debate by objecting that the 
phenomenon reported by Kruger and Dunning (1999) was in fact due to the 
joint action of heuristics called better-than-average and the statistical effect 
of regression.  
This heuristics consists in the tendency of people to assess themselves 
as above average: this excess of optimism is a highly irrational bias in that 
it is logically impossible for everyone to be above average (on the other 
hand, the assessments are given individually and hence the question does 
not arise in these terms).  
The phenomenon of regression consists in the fact that the average of 
many repeated measurements tends to nullify the extremes: hence the self-
evaluation values of subjects tends towards the average. 
Krueger and Mueller (2002) replicated the research of Kruger and 
Dunning (1999) applying some statistical controls to nullify the regression 
effect. In this way they highlighted the effect of focussing on oneself and the 
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degree of confidence in estimates of performance as intermediate variables 
in the process. To sum up, in their opinion the hypothesis based on 
statistical regression and the heuristics of better than average, provide a 
more complete explanation of the results in question. In the same edition of 
the journal, Kruger and Dunning reaffirmed the consistency of the 
phenomenon even after statistical controls of regression.  
Burson, Larrick and Klayman, in a study dated 2006, also supported 
the hypothesis that the results were due to methodological artificiality: in 
this case the variable responsible for the observed effect in the research of 
Kruger and Dunning (1999) were the perceived difficulty of the task. When 
subjects perceived the task as extremely hard, they believed they will 
encounter difficulties and their performance will not be very good and, 
failing to properly account for the degree to which others also experience 
this difficulty, assessed their performance as worse than average. Burson 
and colleagues argued that, if everyone produces similar estimates 
(estimates that are high for tasks perceived to be easy but low for tasks 
perceived to be difficult) what dictates accuracy is less a matter of greater 
insight on the part of some participants, more a matter of perceived 
difficulty. When a test seems easy, everyone believes they have performed 
well in relation to their peers but only top performers are accurate, leaving 
bottom performers overconfident. When the test is thought to be hard, 
however, everyone thinks they have done poorly in relation to their peers 
and bottom performers will be more accurate than their more competent 
peers. In short, Burson et al. (2006) argued that whether top or bottom 
performers are most inaccurate was a result artificially produced by the 
perceived difficulty of the task. 
Burson and colleagues took their results as evidence that the Kruger 
and Dunning (1999) pattern of over- and underestimation of relative 
performance was simply a function of using seemingly easy tasks and, as 
such, did not provide evidence of a relationship between skill level and 
accuracy in self-assessments. 
More recently, Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Kruger and Dunning 
(2008) examined the relationship between self-insight and level of 
competence. They considered three explanations for the overconfidence 
observed among the unskilled: it is a statistical or methodological artefact, 
stemming from insufficient motivation to be accurate and from a genuine 
inability to distinguish weak from strong performance. The studies 
described here are consistent with Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) explanation 
that a lack of skill leads individuals to perform poorly and makes them 
unable to recognize their poor performances. They found that 
overestimation among poor performers emerged across a variety of tasks in 
real world settings too (in which participants had a reasonable amount of 
prior experience and feedback on the tasks). They asked undergraduates to 
estimate how well they had performed on course exams and asked members 
of college debating teams to evaluate their tournament performance. They 
 Do university students know how they perform / Battistelli,Cadamuro, Farneti & Versari 
 
 
 187    
 
provided evidence against the possibility that overestimation among poor 
performers was a product of insufficient motivation to provide accurate 
assessments. 
They offered incentives (monetary and social) to encourage participants 
to provide accurate self-assessments and the results demonstrated that not 
only did incentives failed to improve assessment skills, but actually had the 
opposite effect: poor performers under incentives became more 
overconfident. Furthermore, this pattern of overestimation cannot be 
attributed to a mere statistical artefact, as suggested by Krueger and 
Mueller (2002), based on notions of statistical reliability and measurement 
error.  
The phenomenon in question, i.e. the overestimation of one’s own skills 
and/or the performance of less skilled subjects, is pervasive and can also be 
documented in areas which are very different from those of classic cognitive 
operations. It can be found in the appreciation of practical and professional 
skills: research carried out on chess players, hunters, doctors and nurses 
has reported the same phenomenon (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger & 
Kruger, 2003).  
If anywhere, the problem arises in the interpretation of these results 
and the explanation of the phenomenon: as we have seen, one of the most 
crucial problems relates to broadening the explanatory model via the 
inclusion of the variables Nisbett and Ross (1980) call “hot” and Piaget 
“extra-logical” and which, essentially, are related to one’s self-image. 
It should also be stated that the phenomenon in question has strong 
applications significance in any learning process; in fact, as we highlighted 
in the introduction, the evaluation of the results of a test to a large extent 
determines the outcome of the process. 
Present Study 
The aim of the study was to investigate the ability to self-evaluate 
performance in tests of reasoning of a linguistic, mathematical and formal 
nature, in a group of University students. 
Subjects were asked to provide one objective evaluation (number of 
correct answers) and two comparative evaluations (comparison with the 
performance and abilities of a group of peers).  
More specifically, following the example of Kruger and Dunning, we 
intended to verify the hypothesis that subjects less skilled in cognitive tasks 
tend to overestimate themselves compared to their peers and that more 
skilled subjects, on the other hand, tend to underestimate themselves.  
We expected that, although the subjects can assess their performance 
quite accurately in objective terms, when asked to make a comparative 
assessment, they may make errors due to a lack of metacognitive skills and 
affective components.  As Borkowski's model explains (Borkowski, Chan, & 
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Muthukrishna, 2000), successful information processing results when there 
is an integration of these metacognitive and affective components. 
Instruments 
Three cognitive tasks, each with 20 item, were created using item taken 
from Test di Struttura dell’Intelligenza (Calonghi, Polácek & Ronko, 1974) 
and from Test di Intelligenza Non Verbale  (Pearson & Wiederholt, 1998): 
• a task of arithmetic involving the completion of number sequences 
according to a pattern; 
• a task of formal reasoning, taken from the, requiring subjects to 
complete sequences of geometrical shapes; 
• a task of linguistic reasoning asking subjects to identify linguistic 
analogies, choosing two out of six words linked semantically.  
 
Procedure 
Our sample comprised 65 female students at the Faculty of the Science of 
Primary Education at the University of Reggio Emilia. Mainly female 
students attend this Faculty, but, as known from the literature, gender does 
not play a role in self-assessment abilities. 
Tests were set in groups and in such a way that upon completion, 
subjects were asked to estimate:  
• how many correct answers they thought they had given (from 0 to 20);  
• on a scale of 10, to assess their performance in that specific task “in 
relation to people who are similar to you”;  
• on a scale of 10, to assess their general ability in that domain, “in 
relation to people who are similar to you”.  
Essentially, with the last two assessments, we asked subjects to give 
themselves a mark from 1 to 10. To compare these assessments with actual 
scores (from 0 to 20) in the tests, we converted the scores out of 20 into a 
score out of 10. 
Subjects were divided into three groups, poor, middle and top, each 
with about a third of the total sample, on the basis of the actual scores (see 
act.score) obtained in each task.  
For each task (arithmetic, formal reasoning and linguistic) a ANOVA, 
for repeated measures, 3 (groups: poor, average and top performers) x 4 (act. 
score, est. score, est. perf., est. abil.) was conducted to verify the effect of the 
group variable (between) on the scores (within).  
These were as follows:  
• actual score (act. score) for the test (transformed into a mark out of 
10);  
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• estimated score (est. score), i.e. the number of correct answers the 
subject thought she had given (also transformed into a mark out of 
10);  
• comparative assessment of performance (est. perf.), i.e. the score out 
of 10 attributed to herself by the subject;  
• comparative assessment of ability (est. abil.), i.e. the score out of 10 
attributed for ability. 
We assumed that the data we took a sample from were normally 
distributed. 
Results 
The results of ANOVA [F(6, 114) = 11.16; p < .0000] showed significant 
differences among the three groups (poor, average, top performers) for the 
arithmetic test. (See Table 2). The group of “poor” performers obtained an 
actual score of M = 2.42 (SD = .60), out of 10 whilst the self-evaluation score 
was 5.22 for performance (see Table 1 and Graph. 1) and 5.89 for ability. In 
the group of “top” performers the actual score was M = 9.07 (SD = .79) with 
an average for self-evaluation 8.37 for performance and 7.75 for ability. 
 
Table 1. Average values out of 10 for actual scores, estimated number of correct 
answers, estimated performance and estimated ability for the “arithmetic task” 
 
Poor performers 
M (SD) 
Average performers 
M (SD) 
Top performers 
M (SD) 
Actual Score 2.42 (.60) 5.31 (1.33) 9.07 (0.79) 
Est. score 2.83 (2.75) 4.71 (2.06)  7.73 (3.09) 
Est. perf. 5.22 (2.59) 7.56 (1.21) 8.37 (2.19) 
Est. abil. 5.89 (2.52) 7.13 (1.09) 7.75 (1.84) 
 
Table 2. ANOVA: Group (3) x scores (4) for self-assessment of the arithmetic task 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta  
Squared 
Scores 108,021 3 36,007 24,738 0,000 0,394 
Scores*group 97,444 6 16,241 11,158 0,000 0,370 
Error (Arithmetic) 165,930 114 1,456       
Intercept 5.797,791 1 5.797,791 628,981 0,000 0,943 
Group 407,250 2 203,625 22,090 0,000 0,538 
Error 350,275 38 9,218       
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Graph 1. Real scores and self-evaluation for the arithmetic task for the three 
groups. 
 
A second ANOVA was conducted on formal reasoning with group (poor, 
average, top performers) as independent variable and actual score, estimate 
score, estimate performance and estimate ability as dependent variables 
(see Table 4). 
The results of ANOVA [F(6, 123) = 8.42; p < .0000] showed significant 
differences among the three groups. 
For formal reasoning (see Graph 2), the group of “poor” performers 
obtained an actual average score, out of 10, of M = 2.80 (SD = .84), whilst 
the self-assessment of performance was 6.00 and the self-assessment of 
ability 6.30. In the “top” performers the average actual score was M = 9.29 
(SD = .54), the average self-assessment of performance 8.00 and the average 
self-assessment of ability 7.58. (See Table 3 and Graph 2). 
 
Table 3. Average values out of 10 for actual scores, estimated number of 
correct answers, estimated performance and estimated ability for the 
“formal task” 
 Poor performers 
M (SD) 
Average performers 
M (SD) 
Top performers 
M (SD) 
Actual Score 2.80 (0.84) 6.27 (1.43) 9.29 (0.54) 
Est. score 3.50 (2.36 ) 5.66 (2.90)  7.32 (1.66) 
Est. perf. 6.00 (1.33) 7.32(1.25) 8.00 (1.28) 
Est. abil. 6.30 (1.49) 7.46 (1.14) 7.58 (1.50) 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
poor middle top 
groups
out of 10
act. score 
est. score 
est. perf. 
est. abil. 
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Table 4. ANOVA: Group (3) x scores (4) for self-assessment of the Formal task 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
scores 66.511 3 22.170 12.113 .000 .228 
scores*group 92.509 6 15.418 8.424 .000 .291 
Error (Formal) 225.123 123 1.830       
Intercept 6.618.282 1 6.618.282 1,212.136 .000 .967 
group 265.117 2 132.558 24.278 .000 .542 
Error 223.861 41 5.460       
 
 
Graph 2. Actual scores and self-evaluation for the formal task for the three groups 
 
A third ANOVA was significant for the linguistic test [F(6, 114) = 7.94; p < 
.0000] (See Table 6). The group of “poor” performers obtained an actual 
average score was M = 2.11 (SD = .97), whilst the self-assessment of 
performance 5.43 and the self-assessment of ability 6.57. In the “top” 
performers the average actual score was M = 8.81 (SD = .94), the average 
self-assessment of performance was 6.86 and the average self-assessment of 
ability 7.21 (see Table 3 and Graph 3). 
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out 
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Table 5. Average values out of 10 for actual scores, estimated number of correct 
answers, estimated performance and estimated ability for the “linguistic task”. 
 
Poor performers 
M (SD) 
Average performers 
M (SD) 
Top performers 
M (SD) 
Actual Score 2.11 (0.97) 5.38 (1.24) 8.81 (0.94) 
Est. score 3.59 (  3.23 ) 5.37 ( 2.83)  6.74 ( 2.58) 
Est. perf. 5.43 (1.90) 6.05 (2.01) 6.86 (1.87) 
Est. abil. 6.57 (2.22) 6.15 (1.81) 7.21 (1.89) 
 
Table 6. ANOVA: Group (3) x scores (4) for self-assessment of the Linguistic task 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Scores 42,908 3 14,303 6,380 0,000 0,144 
Scores*group 106,784 6 17,797 7,938 0,000 0,295 
Error (Linguistic) 255,579 114 2,242       
Intercept 4.669,537 1 4.669,537 472,982 0,000 0,926 
Group 184,248 2 92,124 9,331 0,001 0,329 
Error 375,157 38 9,873       
 
 
Graph 3. Real scores and self-evaluation for the linguistic task for the three 
groups. 
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Finally a post-hoc analysis was conducted using the Tukey method to verify 
significant differences among groups for the ability to estimate the number 
of correct answers in the three tasks (see Table 7). Analysis showed that in 
the highly skilled group the estimated number of correct answers was 
always less than the actual number of correct answers and this difference 
was significant in the linguistic task. In this group there is also a significant 
trend for the arithmetic and formal task. 
Table 7. Significance of differences between actual scores and estimated scores 
(Tukey test). 
Test      Poor Average Top 
Arithmetic       .99 .96 .08  
Formal      .99  .94  .11 
Linguistic       .79 .99 .01 * 
*. Post hoc differences are significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Discussion  
In our study we found that self-assessment of the number of correct answers 
(estimated score) differed between the above average, average and below 
average performers. 
In general there was an increasing numerical difference between the 
actual score and the average self-evaluated score, which was smallest for 
the estimate of the number of correct answers and largest for the estimate of 
ability. This showed that subjects were accurate when assessing the number 
of correct answers in a test, but they were increasingly unskilled when 
comparing themselves with their peers. 
The group of poor performers, which provided a very low number of 
correct answers, and were aware of the fact, when asked to provide 
comparative evaluations of performance and ability, overestimated its own 
abilities.  
Top performers were the opposite, underestimating themselves in 
relation to others. Their self-evaluation of number of correct answers 
coincided almost perfectly with the comparative evaluation of performance 
and ability.  
It can therefore be concluded that subjects were fairly accurate self-
assessors. However, this accuracy in terms of performance and evaluation 
was not perfect and it was in the inaccuracy that the phenomenon under 
investigation was revealed.  
Conclusions 
In this manuscript we examined the capacity for self-evaluation of 
University students. We intended to verify the hypothesis that subjects less 
skilled in cognitive tasks tend to overestimate themselves compared to their 
peers and that more skilled subjects, on the other hand, tend to 
underestimate themselves.  
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The results demonstrated that all the subjects in all tasks showed good 
awareness of their level of actual performance. Analyzing comparative 
assessments we found that poor performers tend to significantly 
overestimate their own performance whilst top performers tend to 
underestimate it.  
We found also an increasing numerical difference between the actual 
score and the average self-evaluated score, which was smallest for the 
estimate of the number of correct answers and largest for the estimate of 
ability. 
Even within the comparative evaluations, there was an important 
difference: the evaluation of performance, in the specific test, was 
presumably very influenced by the feedback concerning the test: the subject 
knew if he/she has given the right answer to each question. The more 
general evaluation of ability for that type of test seems to reflect more self-
image, irrespective of the test carried out.  
To formulate an explanatory hypothesis, we could begin with one fact 
(which was also observed in the second study carried out by Kruger and 
Dunning in 1999): in the poor performers, the estimate of correct answers 
(“estimated score” in the graphs) was very close to the actual number of 
correct answers (“actual score” in the graphs).   
This means that the poor performers were well aware of how few 
questions they had got right. The discrepancy between self-evaluation and 
actual performance emerged only in the comparative evaluations, a 
metacognitive operation based on an uncertain, and essentially fictional, 
reference group. Comparative evaluation obliged subjects to refer their self-
evaluation to an average level of performance that they did not and could 
not know, and this lack of any concrete data allowed them to fall back on 
defence mechanisms to safeguard their self-image; the lack of determination 
gave them room to use highly subjective criteria of self-evaluation. It’s a bit 
like saying: “I didn’t do the test well but I didn’t do any worse than most 
other people”. This leads to a kind of optimism in self-evaluation reinforcing 
one’s self-image and seems to be centred more on the person than on the 
task. What comes to the fore is a self-focused defence mechanism which 
seems to correspond to the heuristic better than average, the general 
tendency to overestimate oneself compared to the average. In reality, in our 
opinion, it seems more that poor performers assessed average performance 
on the basis of their own performance, and hence underestimated it. 
On the other hand in the top performers group the estimated number 
of correct answers was always less than the actual number of correct 
answers and this difference was significant in the linguistic task. In this 
group there is also a significant trend for the arithmetic and formal task. 
This might be due to the expression of particularly rigorous and strict 
epistemic motivations: these subjects performed extremely well but also 
doubted that they performed so well: a sort of “methodical doubt”? This 
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particular metacognitive style, expressed in the self-assessments of top 
performers could be correlated with the level that Mason (2001), citing 
Kitchener (1983) and Kuhn (1999), indicated as the third “epistemic” level, 
above the cognitive and metacognitive levels. 
A further contribution to the interpretation of data may be provided by 
the motivational theories of Dweck (1988; 1999) and Moè and De Beni 
(1995). The two motivational styles, focused on “learning - and mastery-
oriented” versus “performance-oriented”, seem to match to the behaviours 
we observed in the poor and top performers. Motivation focused on 
performance involves the need to protect one’s self-image from the 
possibility of failing, which is precisely what happened in the poorly 
performing group. On the other hand, the top performers, who 
underestimated their performance and ability, seem to be more focused on 
the margin of error and hence more interested and motivated by the 
possibility of improving themselves (De Beni & Moè, 2000). 
A more general way of looking at the phenomenon could start with the 
consideration that cognitive and metacognitive processes are regulated by 
highly subjective representations of oneself and the world around us. 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) dealt with these matters at the crossover of 
“hot cognition” (in which “errors” are explained by emotional and 
motivational dispositions) versus “cold cognition” (in which errors are the 
result of mistakes in processing information), and were led “to confess a 
prejudice on our part […] that errors of inference and judgement originate 
not from motivational factors but from perception and cognitive factors” 
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p. 46).  
Examining the phenomenon of “self-overestimation” and “self-
underestimation” respectively in poor and top performers, we confess an 
opposite prejudice. We believe we have found some data supporting the “hot 
cognition” hypothesis. The evident functional and motivational significance 
of the phenomenon of overestimation indicate that explanations are to be 
sought in the safeguarding of the self-image. 
It is also clear, however, that the phenomenon requires further 
extensive investigation of the variables and context to clarify the real forces 
in play.  
First of all a larger and more representative sample would be 
necessary in order to confirm the results also in the Italian population.  
Second, there is a possibility that attributional processes play a role, 
linked to the nature of the task (easy vs. difficult), as well as personality 
variables such as those discussed above in relation to motivational systems 
(performance vs. mastery) and locus of control (internal vs. external). 
Finally, of particular significance, from various points of view including 
applications, may be evolutionary-genetic research of the phenomenon to 
study how it begins and develops in children. 
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